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Políticas distributivas, naturaleza del gasto gubernamental y 
crecimiento económico en democracia con bajos recursos
Abstract
In this paper we analyze how the government in a democratic setup of the developing world manipulates the fiscal instru-
ments to maximize its political gain so that it can retain power. The government and the voters in low income countries are 
generally selfish and myopic in the sense that the electorates prefer to get direct and immediate benefits from the govern-
ment while the government, in turn, tries to seek majority support in the election, by adopting short term and distributive 
policies instead of going for long term growth. Using the theoretical structure of the existing literature, and making modifi-
cations therein, this study demonstrates that the optimal tax rate, public expenditure shares and growth rate are determined 
in terms of technological and behavioral parameters. The simulation results show that if political gain from distributive 
policies is high, the government will allocate a greater share of the fund for distributive purposes adversely affecting eco-
nomic growth. 
Keywords: Selfish government, fiscal instruments, distributive policies, political gain, long term growth.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza cómo el gobierno, en el contexto democrático de los países en desarrollo, manipula los instrumentos 
fiscales para maximizar su ganancia política con el fin de retener el poder. El gobierno y los votantes en países pobres son 
generalmente egoístas y miopes en el sentido de que el electorado prefiere conseguir beneficios directos e inmediatos del 
gobierno, mientras que el gobierno, a su vez, trata de obtener la mayor cantidad de partidarios en una elección, mediante 
la adopción de políticas distributivas y de corto plazo en vez de elegir el crecimiento a largo plazo. Aplicando el marco 
teórico de la literatura existente, y realizando algunas modificaciones en ellas, este estudio demuestra que la óptima tasa de 
impuestos, las cuotas de gasto público y la tasa de crecimiento se establecen sobre la base de parámetros tecnológicos y de 
conducta. Los resultados de la simulación demuestran que si el beneficio político de estas políticas distributivas es alto, el 
gobierno asignará una parte sustanciosa de los fondos con propósitos distributivos afectando contrariamente el crecimiento 
económico.
Palabras clave: Gobiernos egoistas, instrumentos fiscales, políticas distributivas, ganacia política, crecimiento a largo 
plazo plazo.
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INTRODUCTION
The role of the government in economic development, 
optimal size of the government, nature of government 
spending and its impact on growth, public expenditure 
and corruption, distributive politics and economic 
growth have become important issues in the literature 
of public policy and fiscal management (Alesina & 
Rodrik, 1994; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Persson & 
Tabellini, 1994). Often we talk about optimal fiscal 
policy, benevolent government and maximization of 
growth. But maximization of growth may not be the 
main objective of the government. Instead, the govern-
ment may be more interested in increasing its political 
gain by manipulating fiscal instruments to remain in 
power. The government, especially in the develop-
ing world, very often strategically adopts short term 
populist measures and resorts to distributive policies 
sacrificing long term growth (Sasmal, 2004; Marjit, 
Kolmar & Mukherjee, 2001; Marjit & Maity, 2006). 
Both the political parties and electorates are generally 
selfish and myopic in a low income democracy in the 
sense that the voters like to get direct and immediate 
benefits from the government while the government 
tries to stay in power compromising the future economic 
growth and fiscal discipline. It may sound unusual that 
growth is not always necessary to retain power in the 
government. Political stability can very well co-exist 
with economic stagnation in a democratic setup (Sarkar, 
2006). Equally, taxation and government spending is 
not the only mechanism for income transfer. Informal 
economy and weak governance can be an alternative 
route through which redistribution of income can take 
place (Marjit, Mukherjee & Kolmar, 2006). Marjit, 
Kolmar & Mukherjee (2001) demonstrate that the 
greater the scope for redistribution politics, the worse 
will be the quality of public investment.
The median voter theory tells that if inequality 
is high there will be a demand for large government 
which adversely affects economic growth (Alesina & 
Rodrik, 1994). But it is not only the poor who favor 
redistribution and direct and immediate benefits from 
the government. The well-off groups, like business 
groups, big farmers, beaurocrats, government employees 
and other interest groups are also very keen to extract 
maximum benefits directly and immediately from the 
government in the forms of subsidies, salaries, allow-
ances and other concessions, although such expenses 
are not always unproductive altogether. So, given the 
preference of the people and the political compulsion 
of seeking majority support in a democratic set up, the 
government is rather forced to adopt populist short 
term measures, which may not be helpful for long 
term growth. However, this particular nature of fiscal 
decisions and their impact on growth are not discussed 
in the literature in that sense, especially in the context 
of developing countries. Contrary to the median voter 
theory, the papers by Banerjee & Newman (1993) 
and Galor & Zeira (1993) indicate the possibility of a 
different result. The argument is that if redistributive 
policies can enhance human capital, they may not be 
growth retarding.
Our common wisdom suggests that long term 
investment on road, railways, airport and highways, 
irrigation, electricity, telecommunications, education, 
health, science and technology and other infrastruc-
tural facilities accelerate economic growth. However, 
empirical studies exhibit mixed results. In Devarajan 
et al. (1996) and Ghosh & Gregoriou (2008) current 
expenditure has been found to be more productive than 
capital expenditure, while in Chen (2006) the result is 
different. The studies based on cross-country data are 
too aggregative in nature and they overlook many local 
factors. So, more scientific and in-depth studies, pref-
erably in disaggregated form, are necessary to capture 
the effect of public expenditure on growth in a proper 
way. Whether the effects of government spending will 
be reflected in the growth process depends not only 
on the composition of public expenditure, but also 
on the nature of growth, time span of completing the 
public projects and proper mechanism of transmitting 
the external effects of the expenses to growth. It may 
happen that the nature of public spending may matter 
little in the process of economic growth.
Here, it is necessary to differentiate between the 
fiscal management in a developed economy and that 
in the developing world. There is a very standard and Sasmal: Distributive Politics, Nature of Government Spending and Economic Growth 33 Vol. 16, Nº 30
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flourishing literature on the optimal tax rate, composition 
of public expenditure and economic growth. However, 
research on the behavior of the government with respect 
to fiscal decisions and their impact on economic growth 
in the democratic set up of the developing world are 
relatively scanty. Marjit & Maity (2006) and Marjit, 
Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) have some important 
contributions in this field. Sasmal (2002, 2004, 2007) 
finds that if proportion of poor people is higher in a 
society, the government will resort to more redistribu-
tive policies with its negative implication for long-term 
growth. In this paper, we like to contribute to this litera-
ture by analyzing the behavior of the government in the 
determination of the tax rate and nature of government 
spending in a low income democracy keeping in mind 
that the objective of the government is maximization 
of political gain, although the social welfare is not 
altogether neglected. The present study makes a neo-
classical treatment of fiscal management where the 
government acts as an optimizing agent to maximize 
its self interest subject to the constraints imposed by the 
preference of the electorates and the production technol-
ogy. This work also intends to examine the impact of 
policy decisions of the government on economic growth 
in an endogenous framework using the structure of the 
existing literature and making modifications therein to 
fit the purpose of this paper. In this exercise, the Barro 
Model (1990) has been modified by inserting two types 
of government expenditures into the production function 
and an element of corruption in the budgetary alloca-
tions to derive new results. Two types of government 
expenditures are: (i) investment for long term growth 
(G1), and (ii) expenditure for distributive politics (G2). 
It demonstrates that corruption and expenditure on 
distributive politics lower the growth rate. According 
to the Barro Model, the tax rate (r) and expenditure 
shares of G1 and G2 are exogenously given and constant 
over time. In Ghosh & Gregoriou (2008) the optimal 
tax rate and capital and current expenditure shares are 
determined endogenously in terms of technological 
and behavioral parameters and the decision variables, 
although determined endogenously, are constant. The 
results show that the impact of r, G1 and G2 on the rate 
of growth depends on the parameters. To demonstrate 
how the government determines the optimal tax rate and 
public expenditure shares to maximize its political gain 
and to examine the effect of government decisions on 
economic growth, this paper has made some modifica-
tions in the model of Agenor (2008). The results of the 
modifications show that if G2 generates greater political 
mileage, the government will be inclined to allocate 
more funds to G2 undermining long term growth. 
The whole paper has been arranged as follows: the 
first section presents the theoretical models and their 
modifications to derive new results with respect to the 
optimal tax rate and nature of public spending and their 
impact on economic growth. It is followed by an exercise 
of simulation on the effect of two important parameters 
capturing the political mileage from distributive spend-
ing on economic growth. After theoretical discussion, 
some empirical information from the Indian situation 
has been presented to give an idea of the nature of 
public spending in the largest democracy of the world. 
However, no econometric analysis using Indian data has 
been done. In the last section, we present the conclu-
sions and summary results of this paper.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Endogenous Growth with Government Spending
Accumulation of capital, growth of labor force and 
technical progress are generally considered as the ma-
jor three forces of long term growth in a country. Many 
factors are taken exogenous to the growth process. If 
growth takes place due to technical progress coming 
from outside the production system, as has been ex-
plained in Harrod & Solow models, it is called exog-
enous technical progress. But it may very well be en-
dogenous to the system. More specifically, it may be 
the result of some purposeful activities of R&D by any 
private agency or by the government within the system. 
In later period, particularly in the mid-1980s, a group 
of growth theorists led by Romer (1986, 1990), con-
structed a class of growth models in which the key 
determinants of growth have been shown to be endog-
enously determined by the optimizing agents within the 
system. As growth is determined by endogenously Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 34  June 2011
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determined factors in such models, it is called endog-
enous growth (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In Harrod 
and Solow models, saving rate is exogenously given. 
But in Ramsey model, rates of saving and capital forma-
tion are determined by the optimizing behavior of the 
households. Optimal rates of saving and capital accu-
mulation (Ramsey, 1928), population growth (Barro & 
Becker, 1989), accumulation of knowledge and human 
capital (Romer, 1986, 1990; Uzawa, 1965), optimal 
allocation of resources to R&D for technical progress 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1991) are the main works of 
new growth theories. Endogenous growth models not 
only endogenously determine the key factors of growth, 
but also provide mechanism in which interaction of the 
behavior of optimizing agents in the system determines 
the optimal path of growth of the key determinants of 
growth as well as the path of economic growth over 
time. The implication of endogenous growth in this 
paper is to conceive the government as an optimizing 
agent to determine the fiscal variables in an endogenous 
framework to trace out the growth path.
One important requirement of endogenous growth 
is the elimination of diminishing returns to capital. The 
problem with the Solow model is that if capital per unit 
of labor (K/L) written as k rises marginal product of 
capital declines (Inada condition). But, if the returns 
to capital can be stopped from declining, growth can 
be perpetuated and that can be done by continuous 
growth of human capital, knowledge and technical 
progress by necessary investment and R&D activities 
in an endogenous framework. The empirical findings of 
economic growth in different countries in recent years 
strongly support this view. The idea of non-diminishing 
returns to capital is quite plausible if we think of capital 
in a broader perspective to include human capital. Human 
capital apart, endogenously developed technical progress 
or accumulation of knowledge can stop returns to capital 
from falling. The endogenous growth model can be 
built up both in the context of constant and increasing 
returns to capital. The simple model in this category with 
constant returns to capital is AK model (Barro & Sala-
i-Martin, 1995). The important model with increasing 
returns to capital in endogenous framework has been 
developed by Romer (1986) and Rebelo (1991).
The government can accelerate growth by playing 
an important role in the development of infrastructure, 
human capital, knowledge and technology. Barro 
(1990), Alesina & Rodrick (1994) and Barro & Sala-
i-Martin have explained how government spending 
both on production and consumption affects long 
term growth. Obviously, tax rate, allocation of funds 
for productive investments and distributive politics, 
as well as corruption in the government level, have 
become important in the growth process. 
As stated before, we apply in this study the Barro 
Model with some modifications. The differences are 
on two points: (i) unlike Barro, the present work con-
siders a model where government distributes its funds 
on two broad heads: (a) expenditure for long term 
development (G1) and (b) expenditure on distributive 
politics (G2). We assume both types of expenditures 
raise productivity, but G1 is more productive than G2. 
This model shows that if government has to allocate 
a greater share of the funds to G2 to meet its political 
compulsions, growth rate will be lower in the coun-
try. (ii) Leakage of fund due to corruption lowers the 
growth rate.
AN OUTLINE OF THE BARRO MODEL
Endogenous growth with government spending as de-
scribed in Barro and Barro & Sala-i-Martin has specified 
production function in Cobb-Douglas form:
(1)   Y = AKα L1−α G1−α, 
where G is productive public good financed by equal 
amount of tax collection, Y is output, K is private capital, 
L is labour and A is a constant term. G is government’s 
total purchase of private output that is used for develop-
ment of physical infrastructure, human capital, law and 
order etc. G is of public good nature in the sense that 
it is non-rival and non-excludable. Congestion effects 
in public good services are ruled out here.
Now, equation (1) can be written as follows:
(2)   Y = AKα (LG)1−αSasmal: Distributive Politics, Nature of Government Spending and Economic Growth 35 Vol. 16, Nº 30
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are total consumption and total population respectively 
in period t. L(t) = ent and L(O) = 1.
The objective of each household is to maximize 
overall utility
U = ∫ u [c(t)] ent e–ρt dt
The utility function is u(c) = c1– θ – 1 , θ > 0, where
θ is the elasticity of marginal utility w.r.t. per capita 
consumption.
The flow budget constraint of the household is:
a = W + Ra – c – na, where a is net asset per person.
Now, the dynamic optimization problem can be 
solved with the present value Hamiltonian as follows:
H = u(c)e–(ρ –n)t + v [W + (R – n)a – c]
where v is the present value shadow price of income, 
F.O.C. for maximization of U are
(6)   δH = u′ (c)e–(ρ–n)t – v = 0
       δc
(7)  –  δH  = v = – (R–n)v        
         δa
And transversality condition is
  lim [v(t ) · a(t)] = 0
           t→∞
By using Euler equation conditions (6) and (7) can be 
reduced to
(8)  R = ρ –  u″(c) · c  c 
             u′(c)  c             
termed as elasticity of  u′(c) w.r.t. c. It can also be 
called the reciprocal of the elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution (σ). Assuming σ asymptotically constant 
we have a steady state with R and      constant.
This is a constant return to scale production function 
with diminishing returns to a single factor. Assuming L 
as constant, if G is kept unchanged, the function exhib-
its diminishing returns to K. But if G increases at the 
same rate as K, the function shows constant returns in 
K and G, and as a result the economy becomes capable 
of having endogenous growth.
Here, the government follows a balanced budget 
policy and a proportional tax rate, i.e.:
(3)   G = r Y,  
where r is the rate of tax. It is assumed that tax rate (r) 
and government expenditure – income ratio (G/Y) are 
constant over time.
Profit maximization conditions of firms require that 
(i) wage rate (W) equals the after-tax marginal product 
of labor, and (ii) rental rate (R) equals the after tax 
marginal product of capital. That is,
(4)   R = (1 – r) . δY/δK  =  (1 – r) α Ak−(1−α) G1−α
Solving G from the production function in (1) and 
substituting the value in (4), we get,
(5)    R = (1 – r) α Aα (Lr)(1−α)/α
R is now independent of k, and given the values of A, 
L, r, α, rental rate (R) is constant, i.e. MPK is constant. 
So the requirement of endogenous growth is met.
Ramsey Model of Optimal Saving and Capital 
Accumulation:
Following Barro & Sala-i-Martin, we can explain the 
Ramsey model here. This model considers the problem 
of maximization of intergenerational utility of house-
holds over an infinite time horizon. It assumes a constant 
elasticity utility function, i.e. elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption is constant. Population 
growth rate (n) is exogenous and discount rate of util-
ity from future consumption (ρ) is also constant. Per
capita consumption is c(t) = C (t) where C(t) and L(t) 
L(t)
∞
0
1 – θ
•
.
where                    can be
·
u″(c) · c
u′(c)
c
c
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From  the  utility  function  stated  above,  it  follows
σ = 
1
 where θ > 0. Using this result, equation (8) can 
be simplified to gc =  c = 
1  (R –ρ).
Differentiation of (6) w.r.t. time (t) and substitution of
the value in  v  in (7) gives the result 
c
c   in (8). Putting
the value of R from (5) we can write
(9)     gc = gy =  y
 =  c  = 
1    α A   (rL)     (1 – r) – ρ 
  y   c   θ
in a steady state growth.
Equation (9) signifies that r affects growth rate 
through two channels: (1 – r) represents negative effect 
of taxation on the growth rate whereas (r) 
1–α
   α represents 
a positive impact on the growth rate through higher 
productivity. Barro concludes that if r is low, the second 
effect dominates the first, and if r is high the result is 
reversed. If the government is a benevolent one, then 
the growth maximizing tax rate will be consistent with 
the maximization of utility of the households over time 
through Cobb-Douglas production function and growth 
maximizing tax rate will be fixed at r = 1 − α. 
MODIFICATION OF THE 
BARRO MODEL
In the basic model of Barro, the government spends the 
whole amount of tax collection on productive service. 
In an extension of the model, a situation has been 
considered where the government spends a part of the 
tax revenue for consumption of the households and 
of the government itself. Here, growth rate over time 
has been found to be lower than what it would have 
been if the entire tax-revenue were used for productive 
purposes.
The modification of the model also assumes a 
balanced budget policy. But the tax-revenue is spent 
on two heads as mentioned earlier: (i) expenditure 
on long-term development (G1), and (ii) expenditure 
on distributive politics (G2). Chen (2006) considered 
productive and consumptive expenditures in the budget. 
The consumptive expenditure has no role in production. 
As in Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh & Gregoriou 
(2008), in the present modification also both G1 and G2 
are productive, but G2 is assumed to be less productive 
than G1. Here, the government spending on redistribu-
tive politics includes a wide variety of expenditures 
ranging from direct transfers and subsidies to the poor 
to various concessions and leverages to different in-
terest groups of the country. This is done to meet the 
government’s electoral compulsions. It is important to 
note that these expenditures are not totally unproduc-
tive. Our assumption is that such expenditures enhance 
productivity through nutritional efficiency, human skill, 
greater incentives and involvement in the production 
process. However, their impact on production is less 
than that of long term investment. We have considered 
a Cobb-Douglas production function in which both 
G1 and G2 have been included as productive factors in   
addition to private capital and labor, i.e.,
(10)    Y = AKα G1
β (LG2) 1−α−β
K is private capital, L is labor and Y is output and
      
 
L is assumed to be constant as before. L remaining 
constant, if G1 and G2 are increased at the same rate with 
K, there will be constant returns to scale in production. 
L and G2 are perfect substitutes. Actually, here labor is 
being measured in efficiency terms and it is assumed 
that β > 1 − α − β .
Since the government follows a balanced budget 
policy, total tax collection (T) is equal to total govern-
ment spending (G) i.e. T = r.Y = G = G1 + G2.
Let us assume that r, λ and ψ are respectively tax 
rate, share of government-spending for long term invest-
ment and share of leakage of government fund due to 
corruption and they are given and constant over time. 
So, the net available fund with the government is:
(11)   λ(1 – ψ)· r · Y + (1 – λ) (1 – ψ) · r · Y = (1 – ψ) · r · Y 
∂Y   ∂Y
∂G1    ∂G2
θ ˙
c     θ
1    1 –α
α   α · ·Sasmal: Distributive Politics, Nature of Government Spending and Economic Growth 37 Vol. 16, Nº 30
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Equation (5) can be used for incorporating govern-
ment policy into the growth model through equation 
(11).
 
Now to find MPK, let us consider the production 
function in equation (1):
Y = AKα G1
β (LG2)1−α−β
 
In per capita terms it reduces to
(12)  y = Akα g1
β G2)1−α−β   
MPK can be derived from equation (12) as fol-
lows:
(13)  MPK =  
K
k
k G g A L
K
Y
∂
∂
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
∂ − − − 1 1
2 1
α β α β α .
         
   = 
( ) α β α β α
− − − − 1 1
2 1 k G g A
From equation (11) we can write
(14)  g1 = 
G1  = 
1
  · λ (1 – ψ)r.Y
and, G2 = (1 – λ)(1– ψ)Y.
  
Inserting the value of g1 and G2 in (13) we get
MPK = αA   λ   (1 –λ)
1–α–β
 [(1 –ψ)r]
1–α
 L
β
(see Appendix).
Here also, MPK is independent of k and it is constant 
given the parameters and the given values of  r, λ and 
ψ. It suggests that MPK depends on technological pa-
rameters and the given values of  λ, ψ and r.
Now equating rental rate (R) with after tax MPK and 
using Ramsey savings rule as in Barro we get
(15)   gk = gy = gc = 
1
   (1 – r)α A
1 
λ
β
  
  (1 – λ)
1–α–β
[(1 – ψ)r]
1–α 
L
β 
–ρ
in a steady state growth.
The equation (15) has important implications. As 
the growth rate incorporates element of corruption and 
allocation of fund for distributive politics, the growth 
rate becomes lower in (15) as compared to (9). Given 
the values of r and ψ and the parameters of the system 
whether the diversion of fund from distributive policies 
to long term investment will enhance growth depend 
on the value of λ and the production elasticities of K 
and G1 and G2.
Differentiating (15) w.r.t. λ we get,
   0
〉
〈 =
∂
∂
λ
y g
   if   
α
β
λ
−
=
〈
〉 1
By our assumption on production function
β > 1 − α − β   i.e.,   
            
. 
It  implies  that  increase  in  λ  will  lead  to  higher
growth if 
2
1
1
〉
−
〈
α
β
λ  . The growth rate is maximum
if 
α
β
λ
−
=
1
.  If  maximization  of  growth  is  the 
objective,  the  available  fund  will  be  allocated 
between G1 and G2 till the marginal products of G1 
and G2 are equal and from that equality, it follows, 
1
1 2
1 〉
− −
=
β α
β
G
G  (by our assumption β > 1−α−β).
Then it is consistent with   2
1
1
〉
−
=
β
β
λ  . That means,
for maximization of growth, it requires 
2
1
〉 λ .
If it is a selfish government and its objective is 
maximization of political gain it may choose a value
of λ less than 
α
β
− 1
. Tax rate (r) is another determinant
of growth rate. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin, the benevo-
lent government fixes tax rate at r = 1 – α to maximize 
growth. Here, in the modified model, in order to maxi-
mize growth rate, we differentiate equation (15) w.r.t. r 
and set it equal to zero i.e.  . 0 =
∂
∂
r
g y . After simplification
we get  r = 1 – α. That means, optimal tax rate is equal 
to the sum of production elasticities of G1 and G2 i.e.                     
β + (1 − α − β) = 1 − α. It implies that growth maximiz-
ing tax rate remains the same as in the original model 
even when tax revenue is spent on two different heads 
2
1
1
〉
−α
β
L        L
θ
α α
α α α
α α α
1
α
β
αJournal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 38  June 2011
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∝
0
The  representative  agent  maximizes  ‘U’  optimally 
choosing C and k   and derives the growth path as
(16)  ( ) ρ τ λ −
∂
∂
− = =
k
y
C
C
1

 
The benevolent government optimally determines 
τ, g1, g2 to maximize growth taking (16) and other   
constraints as given and the optimal values of  τ, φ and 
(1 − φ) are determined in terms of  technological and 
behavioral parameters. The implication of this result 
is that here also the values of the tax rate and expendi-
ture shares are constant as in the last section although 
they are determined endogenously. The growth rate is 
also determined in terms of parameters and whether 
a change in the composition of public expenditures 
will lead to a change in the growth rate will depend on 
these parameters.
DETERMINATION OF FISCAL 
VARIABLES FOR MAXIMIZATION OF 
POLITICAL GAIN
We have so far discussed how the optimal tax rate and 
composition of public expenditures are determined by 
a benevolent government and examined their impact 
on economic growth. Now we like to see how fiscal 
variables are determined by a government whose 
objective is to maximize political gain to retain power 
by manipulating fiscal instruments. As before, the two 
types of government expenditures are denoted by G1 
and G2 respectively and balanced budget fiscal system 
is assumed. Therefore, G1 + G2 = T = r.Y where Y is 
income, r is tax rate and T is total tax revenue. λ is the 
share of tax revenue allocated to G1 and (1 - λ) is the 
share of G2. So, here we have
      G1 = λ r Y,       G2 = (1 − λ) r Y
In a low income multi-party democracy, the govern-
ment is basically concerned with its short-term gain 
and the political parties are not very different from 
each other in respect of their objectives and economic 
programs. The private agents derive utility from private 
y =  αk–ε  + βg1
–e  + γg2
–e  
 – 
1
   
e
1– δ
˙
and their production elasticities are different. However, 
if the objective of the government is maximization of po-
litical gain, the value of r  may be different from (1 − α).
DETERMINATION OF OPTIMAL TAX 
RATE AND COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURES IN AN ENDOGENOUS 
FRAMEWORK
In the last section we have determined the growth rate 
assuming the tax rate and share of public expenditures 
as given and constant over time. Ghosh & Gregoriou 
(2008), in an extension of the model by Devarajan et 
al. (1996), have constructed a model to determine op-
timal tax rate and optimal shares of capital and current 
expenditures in an endogenous framework to maximize 
growth. In Ghosh & Gregoriou, the welfare maximizing 
fiscal policy of the benevolent government (the second-
best outcome) optimally chooses the fiscal instruments 
to maximize the representative agent’s utility taking the 
private individual’s choices in a decentralized framework 
as a given constraint. The authors have considered a CES 
production technology with two types of government 
spending as in Devarajan et al. (1996):
    
where       α + β + γ = 1,  e ≥ − 1
The government budget constraint is:
  g1 + g2  =  τ y where τ is the tax rate.
The preference of the representative agent is repre-
sented by constant elasticity of substitution in life-
time utility as
U = ∫  C1–δ –1  e–ρt dt  where utility is derived from
private consumption.
The share of government expenditures are:
  g1 = φ τ y    and  g2  =  (1 − φ )τ y 
The agent’s budget constraint is:
           k = (1 – τ)y – CSasmal: Distributive Politics, Nature of Government Spending and Economic Growth 39 Vol. 16, Nº 30
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It can be expressed as
(17)  ( ) α
α
α
β α
α β λ λ
− − −
⋅ − =
1 1
/ 1 r K A Y  where  
α
β α
α
− −
=
1 1
L A A  and L is constant.
Similarly, G2 can be expressed as
(18)  α
β α
α β α λ λ
− −
− =
1
/
1
2 ) 1 ( K A r G
The budget of the economy is: 
(19)  2 1 G G K C Y + + + =    or    C Y r K − − = ) 1 ( 
Given the values of r, λ and other parameters, the 
representative private agent maximizes
(20)  V  =  ∫  
(CG
φ)1–θ
   e–ρt • dt s.t. K = (1–r)Y –C.  
 
It is a definite period optimization problem. In 
Agenor (2008) the private agent solves the problem 
by optimally choosing C and gets the growth path for 
consumption in a decentralized framework as
(21)  


 


+ 




 − =
2
2
G
G
v
v
C
C   
γ σ where   




 − =
σ
ϕ σ γ
1
1
and v is present value shadow price of K. After solution 
and simplification, the growth path is expressed in 
terms of the parameters as
 
The growth rate of consumption depends on the 
given values of  r, λ and the parameters.
In the modification of the model, we incorporate 
the self interest of the government from G2 into the 
political gain function. Now the objective of the gov-
ernment becomes 
(22) Max W = ∫   
(CG2
 
φ)1–θ 
 + η G2 
   
μ  
e–ρt dt 
consumption (C) and distributive expenses (G2) in a 
non-separable form. Both G1 and G2 affect the utility of 
the individuals through production. Since G2 involves 
many populist and distributive measures and the scope 
of rent seeking is there, the party in power can derive 
some political mileage from G2. So, the government as 
an optimizing agent manipulates the fiscal instruments 
to maximize its total political gain, which includes both 
private utility as well as self-interest of the government. 
Naturally, the government may allocate more funds to 
G2 despite the realization that it may adversely affect 
economic growth. Following Agenor (2008), we con-
sider a non-separable utility function in C and G2 for the
private agent as U = (CG
ϕ)1 – θ
 where θ = 1
       
 σ
 is the 
reciprocal of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitu-
tion in utility and ϕ > 0 is the measure of value as-
signed to the contribution of G2 in private utility. To 
ensure concavity property of the function, the restric-
tions imposed are: φ (1 – θ) 〈 1 and (1 + φ) (1 – θ) 〈 1.
As in Chen (2005), the utility function could be 
written in Cobb-Douglas form also:
  U = (Cα G2
1 –α)1 –θ –1 / 1– θ
    
Since G2 generates some electoral benefits to the gov-
ernment apart from contributing to the private utility, 
an  additional  term  is  introduced  into  the  objective 
function  in Agenor  (2008)  to  capture  this  political 
gain in the decision-making.
The self interest of the government from G2 can be 
expressed as
     Φ = η G2
μ
where Φ is the political gain, µ is the measure of value 
assigned to the contribution of G2 in political gain and 
η is the parameter reflecting the capacity of the gov-
ernment to reap the political mileage from G2. Here, 
η > 0, 0 < µ < 1.
The production technology in Cobb-Douglas form 
is:
Y = A K
α G1 (LG2)
1–α–β
2
1 – θ
β
T
0
2
1– θ
.
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s.t. (19), (21) and other constraints. This will be solved 
by  optimally  choosing  r  and  λ  subject  to  the  con-
straints.
For solution of the dynamic optimization problem 
in (22), the current – value Hamiltonian is:
(23) H =
 (CG2
φ)1–θ 
+ η G2
μ + v [(1 – r)Y – C]
Here, Y, G1 and G2 depend on r and λ which will be 
optimally determined by the government in terms of 
parameters [see (17), (18)]. That means, the control 
variables are r and λ.
The F.O.C.s   0 , 0 =
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
λ
H
r
H  will give the optimum
value of r and λ at each point of time. They will be 
determined in terms of the state variable K, costate 
variable v and set of parameters at each point of time. 
Two new parameters µ and η enter into the parameter 
set of the modified model. It is assumed that S.O.C. 
is satisfied.
Now, K   and v  along with transversality conditions 
will trace out the paths for dynamic solution to this 
problem. Along the optimal path the control variables 
r and λ are determined in terms of parameters and time 
only. The set of parameters is : { α, β, θ, ϕ, µ, η, ρ }. 
The dynamic solution of this problem is given by 
the following two differential equations along with the 
initial and transversality conditions:
(24) 
(25)  v
K
H
v ρ +
∂
∂
− = 
Assuming  further  that  the  solution  is  convergent 
and dynamically stable, the growth rate of K can be 
expressed as
(26) 
 
In steady state, all the variables grow at constant
rates. Therefore, growth rate is 
Y
Y
K
K
C
C
g
  
= = = . That
means,  





K
C  is constant in the long-run and growth rate
is also constant. The growth rate is determined in terms 
of the parameters. The range of values of  µ and η and 
their impact on the growth are of special interest in this 
paper. So, we like to see what happens to the growth rate 
and convergent values of K in (26) and (24) if changes 
occur in the values of µ and η. A closed-form solution 
of the differential equation in (24) is difficult to find out. 
Again, the values of  µ and η cannot be easily estimated 
from the empirical data. So, we can run a simulation 
in (24) and (26) to get some idea about the effect of µ 
and η on the growth rate. If the values of η and µ are 
such that political gain from G2 is very high, then the 
government may decide to allocate a greater share of 
the fund to distributive policies undermining growth.
EFFECT OF CHANGE OF VALUES OF µ AND 
η ON THE GROWTH RATE AND STEADY 
STATE VALUE OF K: A SIMULATION
The entire simulation has been done by MATLAB 
software. The differential equation in (24) has been 
solved by the numerical method known as ‘Runga – 
Kutta method’. 
The given values and simulation results are as fol-
lows:
α = 0.2, β = 0.5, ϕ = 0.2, µ = 0.2, η = 0.25,  A = 100, 
K(0) = 10000, C/K = 2, r = 0.25, λ = µ + η
( ) ( ) C r K A r K −






− − =
− − −
α
α
α
β α
α β λ λ
1 1
1 1 
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/ 1 1

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Section A:  Result of change of µ and η on convergent K via λ
  K converges at  37.1837 [at µ = 0.1]   K K   =  Dk/k – 1.9889
    9.7109   [at µ = 0.15]   Dk/k – 1.9862
    2.793     [at µ = 0.20]   Dk/k – 1.9838
    0.970     [at µ = 0.25]  Dk/k – 1.9817
    0.4451   [at µ = 0.3]  Dk/k – 1.9802
    0.2924   [at µ = 0.4]  Dk/k – 1.9793
  _____________________________________________________
  With µ = 0.2
  K converges at   37.18 [at η = 0.25]   K K    =  Dk/k = 1.9889
    9.7109 [at η = 0.3]  Dk/k = 1.9817
    0.2918 [at η = 0.4]  Dk/k = 1.9793
    0.4695 [at η = 0.5]  Dk/k = 1.9803
Section B:  Result of change of µ and η on convergent K via r
  λ = 0.4, r = η − µ
  K converges at  23.8619  [at µ = 0.1, η = 0.31,]   K K   =  Dk/k = 1.994
    68.95      [at µ = 0.11]  Dk/k = 1.995
    173.0791 [at µ = 0.12]  Dk/k = 1.994
  __________________________________________________________
  K converges at  7.0879 [at η = 0.31, µ = 0.1]  K K   =  Dk/k = 1.9928
    1.7858 [at η = 0.32]   Dk/k = 1.9914
    0.3771 [at η = 0.33]  Dk/k = 1.9899
    0.0659 [at η = 0.34]  Dk/k = 1.9881
    0.0094 [at η = 0.35]  Dk/k = 1.9862
  ____________________________________________________________
Section C:  Effect of change of value of  µ and η on the  K K   via λ and r
  λ = η + µ, r = η − µ.
  K converges at  23.8618 [at η = 0.3, µ = 0.1]  K K    Dk/k = 1.994
    5.40664 [at η = 0.31, µ = 0.1]  Dk/k = 1.9925
    0.94244 [at η = 0.32, µ = 0.1]  Dk/k = 1.9908
    0.12289 [at η = 0.33, µ = 0.1]  Dk/k = 1.9888
    0.01165 [at η = 0.34, µ = 0.1]  Dk/k = 1.986
  ____________________________________________________________Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 42  June 2011
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The results show that both K and K / K converge to 
steady state values within the following range of values 
of the parameters: α ≤ 0.2,  µ = 0.10 – 0.12 and η = 
0.31 – 0.35. One such convergent value is shown in 
Figure 1. The convergent value of K and K / K decline, 
while µ and η rises almost in all cases. That means that 
growth rate declines at a steady rate as µ and η rises. 
However, the effect of change of µ on convergent K 
via r in section B gives a different result. It is found 
that convergent value rises with µ and (K / K) has oscil-
lation. In section A, K is convergent and growth rate 
is stable within the range of values of η of 0.25 to 0.4. 
Since closed-form solution is not obtained, λ and r  have 
been expressed in terms of some linear combination of 
µ and η. It is interesting to note that in section C, both 
convergent value of K and growth rate of K decline as 
η rises and its effect is reflected through λ and r. 
The basic proposition of this study is that if the gov-
ernment derives more political mileage from distributive 
programs vis-à-vis investment for long term growth, it 
will be inclined to allocate more funds to distributive 
expenses adversely affecting economic growth. The 
simulation results are on the whole consistent with 
this proposition. 
The effect µ and η on growth via λ, which is our 
prime query, and the simulation results are quite 
consistent with our theoretical proposition. The ef-
fect of increase of η on growth rate via r is also clear. 
But the effect of µ on growth through r is somewhat 
different. The intuitive explanation may be that the 
effect of a change in λ on growth is more direct given 
the production elasticities of G1 and G2, whereas the 
effect of r on growth is not so straightforward. In our 
˙
˙
˙
˙
Figure 1.  Convergence of K(t) and       to steady state values.
Note. K(t) converges at 5.4066 and K / K converges at 1.9925 with µ = 0.1 and η = 0.31.
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present situation, production elasticity of G2 is greater 
than that of K. Now, given the value of λ, increase 
in r following an increase in µ may lead to changes 
in K and Y. In our CRS model, as (1 − α − β) > α, 
increase in r with increase in µ may result in higher 
growth rate.
Year % Share of RE % Share of CE RE / CE
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
57
57
58
57
56
60
58
56
62
63
60
60
62
63
64
64
67
68
69
69
73
75
76
75
78
79
77
77
83
85
83
81
76
77
86
88
83
89
88
43
43
42
43
44
40
42
44
38
37
40
40
38
37
36
36
33
32
31
31
27
25
24
25
22
21
23
23
17
15
17
19
24
23
14
12
17
11
12
1.32
1.32
1.38
1.32
1.27
1.50
1.38
1.47
1.63
1.70
1.50
1.50
1.63
1.70
1.77
1.77
2.00
2.12
2.22
2.22
2.70
3.00
3.16
3.00
3.54
3.76
3.34
3.34
4.88
5.66
4.88
4.26
3.16
3.34
6.14
7.33
4.88
8.00
7.33
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India, 2010-11.
Table 1. 
Percentage Share of Revenue Expenditure (RE) and Capital Expenditure 
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The nature of government expenditure in India ex-
hibits important features for our purpose. Table 1 shows 
that the share of revenue expenditure in the total budget 
is not only high compared to capital expenditure but 
also it has increased over time. In Table 2 we find that 
66% of the annual budget has been earmarked for non-
plan expenditure whereas infrastructure, education and 
health, which are important heads of plan expenditure, 
have received only 12%, 2.7% and 2% respectively. 
The revenue expenditure includes current expenses like 
salaries, pension, allowances, subsidies, interest payment 
and maintenance. That means that the government in 
India is spending more on distributive programs.
It is also evident from Table 3 that large shares of 
both revenue and capital expenditures are spent on 
defense, interest payment on public borrowing and 
subsidies. This section is just a statement of the nature 
of government spending in a developing country with 
democratic set up. Whether such spending is motivated 
by political interest or how economic growth is af-
fected by such spending can not be ascertained from 
this information. To establish a relationship between 
our theoretical proposition and Indian data we need 
rigorous econometric analysis of the data which we 
have not done in this paper. However, in further exten-
sion of this work, it is possible to verify empirically 
the relationship between the nature of government 
spending, political interest and economic growth 
using Indian data. In that case we have to estimate 
the production elasticities of various components of 
public expenditure and see which component of the 
expenditures is more productive. It is also necessary to 
check whether the government is politically benefited 
from distributive policies. Therefore, here we are not 
in a position to conclude that the government in India 
is allocating more funds on less productive heads and 
neglecting growth due to political reasons.
Table 2. 
Expenditure on Major Heads in Union Budget 2010 – 11, 
Government of India (Rupees Crore at current price)
  Total expenditure  -  11,08,749
  Non-plan expenditure  -  7,35,657
  Plan expenditure  -  3,73,092
  Major heads of Plan expenditure
  a) Infrastructure  -  1,37,674 
   b) Education  -  31,036 
  c) Health  -  22,300
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of India.Sasmal: Distributive Politics, Nature of Government Spending and Economic Growth 45 Vol. 16, Nº 30
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Table 3 
Major Heads of Revenue Expenditure (RE) and Capital Expenditure (CE) of the Government of India over time
Year
Defense Expenditure 
as % of RE
Interest Payment on 
Loan as % of RE
Subsidy as % 
of RE
Loan & Advances 
as % CE
Defense Expenditure as 
% of CE
1970-71 33.61 19.36 3.00 62.23 5.93
1971-72 33.95 16.89 2.62 61.80 6.12
1972-73 31.71 17.10 4.52 70.62 6.42
1973-74 31.00 18.46 7.56 70.68 5.81
1974-75 33.82 17.63 7.38 61.73 4.51
1975-76 32.26 17.60 6.74 58.34 4.09
1976-77 28.38 17.99 11.45 65.29 3.99
1977-78 26.20 18.07 14.13 64.94 3.88
1978-79 24.47 18.57 13.81 70.09 3.14
1979-80 26.21 19.42 15.43 65.93 3.66
1980-81 22.75 18.07 14.07 63.23 3.90
1981-82 24.95 20.74 12.60 57.40 4.92
1982-83 23.98 21.01 12.07 61.28 4.37
1983-84 23.32 21.55 13.04 60.63 4.83
1984-85 22.84 21.57 14.58 57.68 4.62
1985-86 20.70 22.14 14.14 59.16 5.16
1986-87 22.46 22.63 13.34 58.02 5.89
1987-88 19.19 24.37 12.95 57.92 14.07
1988-89 17.67 26.39 14.29 58.99 15.13
1989-90 15.88 27.65 16.31 58.85 14.71
1990-91 14.79 29.24 16.54 61.83 14.32
1991-92 13.90 32.32 14.89 60.86 16.84
1992-93 13.06 33.52 11.68 54.48 18.29
1993-94 13.85 33.97 10.73 60.72 20.39
1994-95 13.45 36.08 9.71 61.45 17.65
1995-96 13.47 35.78 9.05 63.30 20.86
1996-97 13.21 37.42 9.75 66.26 20.22
1997-98 14.51 36.40 10.28 66.11 17.60
1998-99 13.80 35.98 10.90 70.03 15.96
1999-00 14.14 36.23 9.83 50.92 24.21
2000-01 13.40 35.75 9.66 50.90 25.93
2001-02 12.62 35.65 10.35 56.35 26.64
2002-03 11.99 34.69 12.81 42.49 20.06
2003-04 11.96 34.32 12.32 25.58 15.18
2004-05 11.29 33.59 11.29 34.24 36.26
2005-06 10.97 30.18 10.81 17.08 48.72
2006-07 10.04 29.20 11.10 12.39 49.18
2007-08 9.12 28.77 11.93 9.55 31.68
2008-09 9.23 24.21 16.34 15.64 45.38
2009-10 9.75 24.21 14.45 13.75 41.51
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India, 2010-11.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 46  June 2011
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
RESULTS
A rich literature is available to explain the determination 
of optimal tax rate and composition of public expen-
diture for maximization of economic growth. But the 
government in a democratic setup of the developing 
world is not always guided by the objective of maxi-
mization of growth. Instead, it may manipulate fiscal 
instruments to  capitalize on its political gain so that it 
can retain power. Both the government and voters in 
such countries are generally selfish and myopic in the 
sense that the voters prefer to get direct and immediate 
benefits from the government. The government also 
adopts short term populist measures and resorts to 
distributive politics in order to strengthen its support 
base undermining long term growth. Not only the poor, 
the well-off groups of the society, including the busi-
ness clusters, farmers’ lobbies, government employees 
and other interest groups, also try to derive immediate 
benefits from the government in the forms of subsidies, 
salaries, allowances and concessions. In effect, long 
term growth suffers.
In this paper we have analyzed the fiscal behavior 
of the government in a low income democracy with 
respect to the nature of public spending and its impact 
on economic growth from a different angle. We used 
the structure of the existing theoretical models and 
made modifications therein to derive new results.   
Unlike the benevolent government, here the govern-
ment is assumed to maximize its political interest by 
optimally choosing the fiscal instruments. The optimal 
tax rate and public expenditure shares are determined 
in terms of technological and behavioral parameters 
in an endogenous framework. The Barro Model has 
been extended to incorporate two types of government 
spending: (i) investment for long term growth (G1), 
and (ii) expenditure on distributive policies (G2). G2 
has been assumed to be less productive than G1. The 
result shows that allocation of more funds to G2 lowers 
economic growth. The model of Agenor (2008) has 
been modified to incorporate political gain from G2. 
G2 enters into the utility function of the households 
in non-separable form with private consumption. It 
also enters into production function and political gain 
function of the government in the modified model. 
Two new parameters µ and η that capture the political 
gain from G2 has been introduced into the model. Here 
also, fiscal variables and growth rate are determined 
in terms of parameters. The theoretical result proposes 
that if political gain from G2 is higher, the government 
will be inclined to allocate more funds to distributive 
policies and this affects economic growth adversely. A 
simulation has been done to examine the effect of the 
two new parameters µ and η; it has been found that if   
µ and η rise, steady state growth rate declines.
Some examples have been cited from the Indian 
situation with respect to the nature of government 
spending in the country and it is found that the govern-
ment spends more on revenue expenditure compared to 
capital expenditure. Not only that the share of revenue 
expenditure has increased over time and, even within 
revenue expenditure, major expenses have been done on 
defense, interest payment and subsidy. No econometric 
exercise has been done with respect to the relationship 
between the nature of government spending and growth 
rate of GNP. 
Naturally, this paper could not ascertain empirically 
whether such spending is due to political compulsions 
or if there is any relationship between nature of gov-
ernment spending and economic growth. However, in 
further research, rigorous econometric analysis can be 
done to verify this relationship.Sasmal: Distributive Politics, Nature of Government Spending and Economic Growth 47 Vol. 16, Nº 30
J. econ. finance adm. sci., 16(30), 2011
Agenor, P. R. (2008). Fiscal Policy and Endogenous Growth 
with Public Infrastructure, Oxford Economic Papers, 
60, 57 – 87.
Alesina, A., & Rodrick, D. (1994). Redistributive Politics and 
Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109, 465 – 90.
Banerjee, A. V., & Newman, A. F. (1993). Occupational 
Choice and the Process of Development. Journal of 
Political Economy, 101(2), 274 – 98.
Barro,  R.  J.  (1990).  Government  Spending  in  a  Simple 
Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Political 
Economy, 98(October) S103 – S125.
Barro,  R.  J.,  & Becker, G. S. (1989). Fertility  Choice  in 
a  Model  of  Economic  Growth.  Econometrica, 
57(March), 481 – 501.
Barro, R. J., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995). Economic Growth. 
Boston: McGraw Hill.
Chen, B.  L. (2006). Economic Growth with an Optimal 
Public  Spending  Composition.  Oxford  Economic 
Papers, 58, 123 – 36.
Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V., & Zou, H. (1996). The Compo-
sition of Public Expenditure and Economic Growth. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, 313 – 344.
Galor,  O.,  &  Zeira,  J.  (1993).  Income  Distribution  and 
Macroeconomics.  Review  of  Economic  Studies, 
60(1), 35 – 52.
Ghosh, S., & Gregoriou, A. (2008). The Composition of 
Government Spending and Growth: Is Current or 
Capital Spending Better? Oxford Economic Papers, 
60, 484 – 516.
Grossman, G. M. & Helpman, E. (1991). Innovation and 
Growth in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy. Reserve Bank 
of India, 2010-11.
Marjit,  S.,  Kolmar,  M.,  &  Mukherjee,  V.  (2001). 
Redistributive Politics, Corruption and Quality of 
Public  Investment.  Paper  presented  at  the  Fiscal 
Affairs Division, IMF.
Marjit, S., & Maity, D. (2006). Politics and Contemporary 
Macroeconomy of India. In India Macroeconomics 
Annual, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences (pp. 
9-55). India: Sage Publications Ltd.
Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., & Kolmar, M. (2006) Poverty, 
Taxation and Governance. Journal of International 
Trade & Economic Development, 15(3), 325 – 333.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A Rational Theory 
of the Size of the Government. Journal of Political 
Economy, 89(51), 914 – 27.
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is Inequality Harmful 
for  Growth?.  American  Economic  Review,  84(3), 
600 – 621.
Ramsey,  F.  (1928).  A  Mathematical  Theory  of  Saving. 
Economic Journal, 38(December), 543 – 559.
Rebelo, S. (1991). Long-run Policy Analysis and Long-run 
Growth.  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  99(June), 
500 – 521.
Romer,  P.  M.  (1986).  Increasing  Returns  and  Long-run 
Growth.  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  94(Octo-
ber), 1002 – 1037.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. 
Journal of Political Economy, 94(October), S71 – 
S102.
Sarkar, A. (2006). Political Economy of West Bengal: A 
Puzzle and a Hypothesis. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 61(4), 341 – 48.
Sasmal, J. (2002). Size of Government, Nature of Govern-
ment Spending and Level of Corruption in a Low 
Income Country: A Static Partial Equilibrium Anal-
ysis. Artha Beekshan, 11(3), 12 – 21.
Sasmal, J. (2004). Endogenous Growth with Government 
Spending – Effects of Size of Government, Distribu-
tive  Politics  and  Corruption  with  Special  Refer-
ence to Low Income Countries. Paper presented at 
the Annual Conference of the Dept. of Economics,               
Jadavpur University, India.
Sasmal, J. (2007). Size of Government, Distributive Politics 
and Governance : A Simple Political Choice Model. 
Proceedings of the 90th Annual Conference Volume, 
Indian Economic Association, 1240 – 1246.
Uzawa, H. (1965). Optimal technical change in an aggregative 
model of economic growth. International Economic 
Review, 6(January), 18 – 31.
ReferencesJournal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 48  June 2011
J. econ. finance adm. sci., 16(30), 2011
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                   ∂K
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 G 1 = λ(1 – ψ) r .Y   and  G2 = (1 – λ) (1 – ψ) r.y
  g1 =  G1  =  1
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Putting the value of Y from equation (1) in G2 we get
  G2   = (1 − λ) (1 − ψ) r. AKα G1
β (LG2)1−α−β
or,       G2   
 =  (1 − λ) (1 − ψ) r. AKα G1
βL1−α−β
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β  G1
β 
After simplification, we get
(2) G2 = {(1 –λ) (1 –ψ)r. A}        k        L
1–α–β
  G1   
β
In the same way, putting the value of Y in G1 we get
  G2 = λ(1 − ψ)r. AKα G1
β (LG2)1−α−β
Following the same procedure as in G2 we get
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Now, putting the value of G2 from (2) in G1 we get,
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α + β
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After simplification, G1 is expressed as
(4)  G1 = λ
         [(1 − ψ)rA] 
1
   (1 – λ)
1–α–β
  · L
1–β
    k  
Again putting the value of G1 from (4) in G2 in (2) we get
(5)  G2 = {(1 − λ)(1 − ψ)rA}α + β  · k α + β  · L α + β
 ·  λ
α + β [(1 − ψ)rA] 
1
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Simplification of (5) gives
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1
  · L
 1 – β 
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Substituting the values of g1 and G2 in MPK from (4) and (6) respectively, and after simplification, we get
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